Modern cybersecurity has reached a quiet breaking point. Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems are now standard across laptops, servers, and cloud workloads, yet they all rely on a fragile assumption: that the operating system is telling the truth. As attackers increasingly target the kernel itself, that assumption is becoming harder to defend.
Patent US12524535B1, assigned to Uberspark Inc, challenges this foundation directly. Rather than improving how security tools ask the operating system what happened, the patent proposes a system that no longer relies on the OS as a source of truth at all. Instead, it introduces a way to observe system behaviour from below the OS and mathematically guarantee that what is observed is both accurate and complete.
This shift reflects a broader movement in modern security design toward minimizing implicit trust in system components. Similar ideas underpin zero-trust architectures, where verification replaces assumption at every layer of the stack (see our related analysis on zero-trust architecture patents).
Why Modern Security Tools Hit a Structural Limit
Most endpoint security platforms operate inside the operating system or at its boundary. They hook into system calls, kernel callbacks, and OS-level logging mechanisms to collect telemetry used for detection, forensics, and compliance.
This model works-until the operating system itself is compromised. Once an attacker gains kernel-level control, they can manipulate or suppress the very signals that security tools depend on. Logs can be falsified, hooks removed, and alerts silenced, all while the system appears healthy from the outside.
Efforts to reinforce this approach-such as signed drivers or kernel protection features-remain reactive. They still assume the OS can reliably enforce its own integrity. In high-assurance environments, that assumption breaks the chain of custody for telemetry.
Problem and Solution: Replacing Trust with Proof
The problem is not insufficient monitoring, but misplaced trust. As long as telemetry depends on OS cooperation, a compromised kernel can distort reality.
Uberspark’s solution is to remove the operating system from the trust model entirely. The patented system enforces telemetry collection below the OS, at the hypervisor or secure monitor level. Instead of asking the OS to report events, the system observes execution directly as it occurs.
What makes this approach distinct is not only where observation happens, but how it is guaranteed. The telemetry logic itself is formally verified, meaning it is mathematically proven to behave correctly under all defined conditions. This transforms telemetry from a best-effort signal into a provable record.
How Formally Verified Telemetry Works
The system rests on two core pillars.
First, hypervisor-level observation. By operating outside the guest operating system, the telemetry engine can inspect memory, CPU state, and execution flow directly. Even a fully compromised kernel cannot hide or alter its behavior at this level.
Second, formal verification of telemetry probes. The code that defines what events are captured is mathematically proven for soundness and completeness. Soundness ensures that recorded events truly occurred. Completeness ensures that relevant events cannot be missed. Together, these guarantees eliminate blind spots and false reporting.
The result is telemetry that is not merely collected, but provably correct by construction.
Strategic and Competitive Implications
This patent aligns closely with emerging needs in zero-trust, confidential computing, and regulated environments. As workloads move into isolated execution environments, the ability to prove what occurred inside those environments becomes critical for compliance and auditability.
For traditional EDR vendors, the implications are structural. As operating system vendors increasingly restrict kernel access, security tools are losing visibility at precisely the layer they depend on. Externally enforced, formally verified telemetry offers a path forward that does not require privileged OS integration.
More broadly, the invention shifts security assurance from heuristic detection toward cryptographic-grade guarantees-an important distinction in sectors where evidence, not probability, determines trust.
From Heuristic Monitoring to Guaranteed System Truth
Patent US12524535B1 does not simply improve endpoint detection; it redefines the trust model underlying system telemetry. By replacing OS-reported signals with mathematically verified observation, the invention addresses a class of attacks that cannot be patched away.
As regulatory and compliance frameworks increasingly demand proof rather than plausibility, architectures that generate tamper-resistant, verifiable records of system behavior will become essential. In that future, trusting the operating system is no longer sufficient. Uberspark’s patent points toward an architecture where certainty is engineered into the system itself.
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